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National courts and European soft law: Is Grimaldi still good law? 
 
Abstract This Article discusses the Grimaldi obligation, that is, the duty of national courts to take 
European soft law into account when deciding cases. In view of the evidence from the longitudinal 
study of the Grimaldi jurisprudence, it is suggested that although the doctrine has not changed, 
the world around it has. While the ECJ has not reversed the precedent set by Grimaldi, nearly 
three decades of EU soft law making have eroded the foundations of the doctrine to the extent that 
the obligation has become heavily nuanced. First, to the extent that the soft law measure is issued 
by the EU institution and its development is foreseen in primary or secondary law, Member State 
courts can depart from the interpretation offered in the measure only if they can provide detailed 
and substantively valid reasons why it should not apply. Second, if the soft law instrument is free-
standing, that is, is not derived from primary or secondary law, or where non-binding guidance is 
given by actors other than the institutions, the Member State court has more leeway to decide 
whether or not to take non-binding guidance into account. The third noteworthy feature that 
emerges from the analysed jurisprudence is that Member State courts have become more proactive 
in challenging EU soft law, and, insofar as it is an act of the EU institution, the Court is cautiously 
accepting validity challenges posed by Member State courts in the preliminary reference 





In November 1989 when the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled on the occupational disease 
case sent to it by the Belgian Labour Court, the ECJ hardly thought it was handing down a 
landmark decision.1 In Grimaldi, named after an Italian migrant worker, the ECJ held that national 
courts are bound to take non-binding Commission Recommendations into account when 
adjudicating disputes.2 It is, of course, impossible to go back in time and establish what the judges 
were really thinking, but what we know is that the ECJ’s decision in Grimaldi has never accrued 
any serious attention from EU lawyers. Also, as we will see below, the decision has been sparingly 
referenced in the ECJ jurisprudence. However, for any scholar who has ever ventured to research 
or write on EU soft law, the Grimaldi decision occupies a special place in the case law, and it is 
difficult to find a scholarly piece on soft law that does not make a reference to Grimaldi. Indeed, 
it constitutes a leading case in EU soft law scholarship. 
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 Much has happened in the nearly three decades that have passed. Most importantly, the 
generation of soft law measures is reaching levels that were previously unimaginable and 
astounding, even from today’s point of view. The Commission, EU agencies, and ad hoc 
administrative networks publish non-binding soft law guidance across a growing range of policy 
fields, ranging from detailed guidelines clarifying the application of state aid rules for the financial 
sector during the European debt crisis, to guidance explaining how to interpret the provisions of 
the Medicinal Products Directive, to technical guidance documents intended to assist stakeholders 
in the implementation of the Water Framework Directive. There is not only more of it, but it is 
more complex and its mastery requires more time, expertise, and knowledge than before. Perhaps 
most importantly, nearly everyone is now a potential soft lawmaker. The Commission is still the 
most prolific soft lawmaker, but in contrast to earlier decades it is increasingly in the habit of 
preparing soft law together with groups of experts from national authorities and professional 
associations from industry. EU agencies have also emerged as important actors in the EU’s soft 
law scene, adopting soft law documents either alone or in collaboration with representative actors 
from industry and civil society.  
Matching this tremendous growth in soft lawmaking has been a growth in the literature 
devoted to assessing its causes, consequences and prospects of review.3 The role and performance 
of the EU courts in controlling the adoption and use of soft law by the EU institutions has been 
discussed within this wider body of literature. Some view judicial intervention as a positive 
evolution, while others are more wary, ultimately viewing the courts’ role as deferential, at most 
a backup. In this respect, it is striking that while one of the most famous cases concerning soft law 
addresses the duty of national courts to have regard to recommendations, little to no debate has 
been raised concerning EU soft law in national legal systems, including the Member State courts’ 
use of EU soft law.4 
                                                             
3 Oana Stefan, Soft Law in Court. Competition Law, State Aid and the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(Kluwer Law, 2013), 162; Linda Senden, Soft Law in the European Union (Hart Publishing, 2004); Emilia Korkea-
aho, Adjudicating New Governance. Deliberative Democracy in the EU (Routledge, 2015); Joanne Scott and Susan 
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This Article is an attempt to initiate such debate by asking whether the national courts 
should keep an eye on the development of non-binding law and take soft law into account when 
resolving cases. But why ask this question that was answered nearly thirty years ago in Grimaldi? 
The answer lies in the question. The decision in Grimaldi was given at a time when the EU 
regulatory framework was drastically different from what it is now, and the use of soft law as a 
mechanism of EU governance was very much in its infancy. In order to find out if the ECJ has 
used Grimaldi again and, in so doing, whether it has modified its scope of application, a 
longitudinal analysis of the relevant jurisprudence is carried out. The analysis reveals that since 
the 1989 Grimaldi ruling, the ECJ has referred to Grimaldi only seven times, most recently in 2014 
in ‘Baltlanta’ UAB. All of these judgments are preliminary rulings under Article 267 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). However, the ECJ’s judgment does not 
formally decide the issue, and it is the referring national court that ultimately settles the individual 
dispute and also decides whether it takes soft law into account. For this reason, this Article traces 
those seven preliminary rulings back to the national settings to determine whether and, if so, how, 
the national court has operationalised the Grimaldi guidance in delivering the final domestic ruling. 
Besides the simple passage of time, there is another reason to revisit the Grimaldi guidance. 
Recent judgments by the ECJ throw into question whether the Grimaldi doctrine is still relevant 
to national courts in their decision-making. This issue is raised in particular by two judgments: 
Chemische Fabrik Kreussler and Koninklijke, delivered respectively in 2012 and 2016.5 In the 
former, otherwise run-off-the-mill case, the ECJ analysed the Commission guidelines as if the 
question was novel and concluded that national courts “may take” soft law into account when 
interpreting EU law. Although the judgment departs from Grimaldi, it does not justify the 
departure – indeed, it does not even cite it. Besides softening the expression of obligation, the 
Court took an unexpected step by considering the guidelines themselves. In Koninklijke, the ECJ 
had to resolve the incompatibility between EU soft law and national legislation, and the resulting 
disagreement between the Dutch regulatory agency on the one hand, and the national court on the 
other. Here the ECJ stretched the Grimaldi guidance to the other limit, arguing that the national 
court may depart from the interpretation offered in the soft law measure only where it is factually 
justified and supported by a detailed examination of Member State market conditions. I will 
                                                             
5 Case C-308/11, Chemische Fabrik Kreussler & Co GmbH v Sunstar Deutschland GmbH, EU:C:2012:548, Case C-
28/15, Koninklijke KPN and Others v Autoritiet Consument en Markt (ACM), EU:C:2016:692.  
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explore and analyse both cases to determine what is left of Grimaldi, in particular whether they 
are intended to develop or complement it, or rather act as outright replacement of the doctrine. 
Although the starting point of the analysis seems perhaps unnecessarily narrow, focusing 
on Grimaldi and the subsequent rulings that cite it, the close analysis of the Grimaldi case law is 
important for at least three reasons. First, the systematic examination of the case law widens into 
a more general discussion of soft law acts in the Member State courts and helps to gain insights 
into problems that national judiciaries might encounter in relation to EU soft law. 6  Has the 
extensive amount of soft law eased adjudication of EU law in national courts, or has it led to new 
problems? Second, we need clarity on the scope and contemporary relevance of Grimaldi to ensure 
that EU law is duly applied in Member States. For better or worse, soft law constitutes a part of 
the EU legal order, and uncertainty about the national effects of soft law ultimately endangers the 
principles of legal certainty, legality, and effective judicial protection. Third, and taking into 
account the fact that the Grimaldi jurisprudence consists of preliminary rulings, the case law 
analysis is particularly relevant given the importance of the preliminary ruling mechanism for 
private applicants. The mechanism offered in Article 267 TFEU is the only way through which 
national economic and private actors can challenge a soft law instrument. As non-binding 
documents are excluded from actions for annulment under Article 263 TFEU,7 they are only 
challengeable indirectly through the preliminary reference procedure, assuming the parties can 
convince the judge to refer the case to the ECJ.  
 The outline of the Article is as follows. Section II briefly introduces the Grimaldi ruling 
and explains how the judgment has been understood in legal scholarship. Section III offers a 
longitudinal overview of the preliminary rulings concerning soft law acts. The analysis is not 
                                                             
6 There is literature discussing soft law in Article 265 TFEU proceedings but infringement proceedings do not 
involve national courts (except in rare Köbler situations), and thus do not shed light on the difficulties associated 
with the use of soft law in domestic settings. Note also that the present contribution is not concerned with the 
implications of EU soft law for national regulatory authorities. However, a version of the Grimaldi duty, fortified by 
the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU, is generally considered to apply to Member State 
authorities. In other words, while soft law instruments are not binding on domestic authorities, they are to be taken 
into account. For the latest formulation, see Opinion of AG Wahl in Case C-526/14, Kotnik and Others, 
EU:C:2016:102, point 39. 
7 Article 263 TFEU expressly precludes review of recommendations and opinions. However, the EU court has 
preferred substance over form and has occasionally found that a non-binding measure adopted by the institution is 
intended to produce legal effects and is hence reviewable. A far greater problem is the courts’ case law regarding the 
standing conditions for private applicants in direct actions for annulment of EU acts. 
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intended to cover all the cases where the ECJ has dealt with soft law instruments.8 Rather, by 
focusing on those rulings where an explicit reference is made to Grimaldi, it attempts to answer 
the question – in keeping with the focus of this Special Issue – whether there is a common pattern 
in the preliminary ruling procedure, and what such a pattern looks like. As the Grimaldi decision 
itself prescribes very little as to how the judgment should be implemented, Section IV attempts to 
establish whether national courts apply the guidance offered by the ECJ when they deliver their 
final judgments. Section V asks what the national court should do with soft law instruments after 
Chemische Fabrik Kreussler and Koninklijke, the proverbial question being: to take or not to take 
soft law into account? Finally, Section VI draws conclusions and explores possible future 
directions of the Court’s case law in situations involving EU soft law in national settings.  
As far as national courts are concerned, the analysis shows that, regardless of the status 
given to soft law in their domestic legal orders, Member State judges are obliged to refer to soft 
law when they adjudicate on cases falling within the scope of application of EU law. However, the 
careful analysis of relevant case law also shows that, over time, the obligation has become heavily 
nuanced, and can serve as much to circumscribe as to galvanise national judges in their application 
of EU law in domestic cases. In other words, a “soft” soft law doctrine. 
 
II It all started with Grimaldi… 
 
Mr Grimaldi was a migrant worker of Italian origin who suffered from an occupational disease 
caused by mechanical vibrations from the use of a pneumatic drill. The Belgian Fonds des maladies 
professionnelles refused to compensate the illness affecting his hands on the grounds that the 
illness was not recognised by the Belgian schedule of occupational diseases. The illness was, 
however, included in the European schedule of occupational diseases, annexed to a 1962 
Commission Recommendation. The recommendation was given to encourage the Member States 
to introduce the schedule as part of national social legislation. This and another Commission 
recommendation, issued four years later in 1966 on the conditions for granting compensation to 
persons suffering from occupational diseases, were based on ex Article 155 of the EEC Treaty (ex 
                                                             
8 As the ECJ does not use the term “soft law”, the systematic analysis is only possible by searching the Curia 
database using certain policy instruments such as “recommendation” or “guidelines” or particular rulings like 
Grimaldi.  
 6 
Article 211 EC), which conferred on the Commission a general power to “formulate 
recommendations or deliver opinions on matters dealt with in this Treaty, if it expressly so provides 
or if the Commission considers it necessary”. 
The Belgian Labour Court submitted the reference to the ECJ inquiring whether the 
European schedule of occupational diseases has a direct effect, allowing Mr Grimaldi to rely on 
the recommendation. AG Mischo based his analysis on the comparison of the normative effects of 
recommendations on the one hand and regulations and directives on the other: recommendations, 
unlike the other two instruments, do not have binding force. Since binding force is necessary for a 
legal instrument to have a direct effect, recommendations cannot be relied upon to claim or enforce 
rights.9 Although the referring court in no way questioned the authority of the ECJ to rule on the 
interpretation or validity of the recommendation, AG Mischo perceived it necessary to 
complement his opinion by observing that the Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter before 
it.10  
In the judgment, the ECJ first endorsed the question about its jurisdictional reach. The ECJ 
considered it to be within its powers to give a preliminary ruling on the validity and interpretation 
of all acts of the institutions of the Community without exception, including non-binding 
instruments like recommendations and opinions.11 As regards the second question, i.e. whether 
recommendations can produce binding effects, the Court, like AG Mischo, concluded that 
recommendations cannot give rise to rights upon which individuals may rely in court.12 With both 
concurring on the limited right-generating capacity of recommendations, the real surprise was that, 
unlike AG Mischo, the ECJ did not stop after having confirmed that recommendations do not 
create enforceable rights. Wishing to “give a comprehensive reply to the question asked by the 
national court”, the Court went further by acknowledging the capability of recommendations to 
create legal effects. The ECJ called attention to the fact that recommendations are not to be 
regarded as having no legal effects, and the national courts are bound to take non-binding measures 
into consideration, especially “where they cast light on the interpretation of national measures 
                                                             
9 Opinion of AG Mischo in Case C-322/88, Grimaldi, EU:C:1989:366, point 4. 
10 Ibid., point 12 and et seq. He referred to the judgments in Case 113/75, Frecassetti v Amministrazione delle finanze 
dello Stato, EU:C:1976:89 and Case 90/76, Van Ameydev UCI, EU:C:1977:101. 
11 Case C-322/88, para. 8. 
12 Ibid., para. 16. 
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adopted in order to implement them or where they are designed to supplement binding Community 
provisions”.13  
In standard text books on EU law, Grimaldi is usually brought up to affirm the jurisdiction 
of the ECJ to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation or validity of all acts of the 
institutions or, vice versa, the national court’s mirror-image right to make a reference to the ECJ 
in such situations.14 However, for scholars of soft law in particular, Grimaldi is a household name 
as the case in which the ECJ expressly acknowledged the capability of non-binding law to create 
legal effects.15 Compared to earlier case law, Grimaldi marked the hardening of the status of soft 
law for national courts from “voluntary” to “mandatory” interpretation aid.16 These legal effects, 
necessitating that courts give due regard to non-binding measures, are generally considered to only 
apply to national courts, although no compelling reason has to date emerged to explain why the 
same obligation would not apply to all courts, both EU and national.17  As shown below, the 
difference in treatment between EU and national courts is insignificant in practice, as the EU courts 
also take soft law into account.18  
What kind of obligation does Grimaldi impose on national courts? Some argue that it 
involves a duty of consistent interpretation (obligation of result), obliging a national court to 
interpret national legislation in light of soft law instruments adopted by the institutions.19 For others, 
a broad reading of this kind would contradict the principle of legal protection by allowing soft law 
to impose rights and duties “through the backdoor”, and, hence a more restrictive interpretation of 
                                                             
13 Ibid., para. 18. The French expression is “sont tenus de prendre les recommendation en considération…”. 
14 Among others, see Paul Craig and Graínne de Búrca, EU Law. Text, Cases, and Materials (6th edn, OUP, 2015) 
109; Catherine Barnard and Steven Peers, European Union Law (OUP, 2014), 286. 
15 As these effects come in play indirectly, by way of influencing the court’s reasoning, these effects are sometimes 
referred to as “indirect legal effects”. See Senden 2004, 240 and 267.  
16 See ibid., 402–407. 
17 Ibid., 399. See also Stefan 2013, 164. 
18 In some policy areas more than others. In cases concerning customs tariffs, the Court has used the explanatory 
notes drawn up by the Commission. Typically, the Court points out that they may be an important aid to the 
interpretation of tariff headings but do not have legally binding force. However, the Court uses these notes to guide 
its interpretation. See Case C-666/13, Rohm Semiconductor GmbH v Hauptzollamt Krefeld, EU:C:2014:2388, para. 
25 and paras 47 and 48 or Case C-297/13, Data I/O, EU:C:2014:331, para. 50. Two factors explain why the Court is 
open to taking the explanatory notes into account. First, much importance is attached to the uniform application of 
the Common Customs Tariff, and the explanatory notes are an important means of ensuring this uniformity. Second, 
the notes are published in the Official Journal of the European Union. 
19 Anthony Arnull, “The Legal Status of Recommendations”, 15 European Law Review (1990), 318. The judgement 
on the basis of which Arnull makes the argument is Case C-14/83, Von Colson, EU:C:1984:153. The question on the 
meaning of a duty to take soft law into account is part of a larger dilemma of what national law’s (and courts’) 
compliance with EU law requires. For the discussion, see Suvi Sankari, European Court of Justice Legal Reasoning 
in Context (Europa Law Publishing, 2015), 238–239.  
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Grimaldi should be preferred.20 This narrower understanding of the Grimaldi guidance consists of 
the “duty of effort”, that is, an effort on the part of national courts to take recommendations into 
account “when they can actually contribute to the establishment of the meaning and scope of hard 
Community law”.21 In this latter case, while formalising the role of soft law in the interpretation of 
the law, Grimaldi would leave it up to the national courts to decide whether or not to use soft law. 
The disagreement arises at least partially from difficulties to pin down the specific meaning of the 
expression “take into account”. According to dictionary definitions, the expression can mean 
“including” something when making a decision or judgment or “thinking” about something when 
making a decision or judgment,22 the former corresponding to the obligation of result and the latter 
to the obligation of effort. The choice of one cannot, however, be taken out of context, and the 
meaning of “take into account” can only be determined through analysis of the Court’s use of the 
phrase.  
Does the policy area matter in the interpretation of the Grimaldi guidance? The impact of 
a particular policy area on the strictness of the obligation is a question on which there is limited 
information, and, what little there is, comes from competition policy. Following the 
decentralisation of competition law enforcement, which placed national courts on an equal footing 
with the EU courts in the application of EU competition law, the argument has, however, been 
made that the stricter interpretation of Grimaldi serves to ensure the consistency of application of 
EU competition law. 23  Also in the context of competition policy, Lehmkuhl goes as far as 
suggesting that the Grimaldi obligation can be read as acknowledging the right of the Commission 
to use soft law to strengthen its position in relation to national courts.24 Unlike the EU-national 
courts relationship that is widely discussed and researched, the relationship between the 
Commission and national courts, is, with the exception of competition policy, unexplored.25 This 
                                                             
20 Senden 2004, 473. 
21 Ibid., 474. 
22 http://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/take+into+account (last visited 5 June 2016). 
23 Stefan 2013, 165. See also Georgieva 2015. 
24 Dirk Lehmkuhl, “On Government, Governance and Judicial Review: The Case of European Competition Policy”, 
28 Journal of Public Policy (2008), 151.  
25 Council Regulation 1/2003 establishes a procedural innovation enabling the Commission to submit written 
observations in national court proceedings, the innovation that Wright calls “Commission’s own preliminary 
reference procedure”. See Kathryn Wright, “The European Commission’s Own ‘Preliminary Reference Procedure’ 
in Competition Cases”, 16 European Law Journal (2010), 736–759. 
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makes it difficult to judge whether, and how widely, the Commission uses soft law as a medium 
to bolster itself vis-à-vis national courts in certain policy areas.  
An additional related problem is the material scope of Grimaldi. The ECJ did not use the 
term “soft law” in deciding Grimaldi. In fact, a search on the Court’s Curia database makes evident 
that soft law does not belong to the CJEU’s vocabulary, and no single case of the use of the term 
could be found in the search results. Interpreted narrowly, the conclusion would then have to be 
that Grimaldi only lays down that Commission recommendations have legal effects to be 
considered by national courts. What is the significance of the decision for soft law instruments 
other than recommendations as enshrined in Article 288 TFEU? Does the Grimaldi guidance treat 
alike all soft law instruments adopted by the institutions, not just those of the Commission? What 
about non-binding guidance issued by EU agencies or the Commission in collaboration with 
industry stakeholders?26   
My intention is not to dwell upon these issues at the abstract level, but rather to examine 
the Court’s post-Grimaldi jurisprudence with a view to finding answers to the questions mentioned 
above.  
 
III From Grimaldi to ‘Baltlanta’ UAB: A longitudinal view on the Grimaldi case law 
 
A. EU Level 
 
So, what happened after Grimaldi? Given that the Grimaldi judgment was handed down in 1989, 
nearly thirty years ago, one might be forgiven for assuming that by 2015 the Grimaldi decision 
would have been referred to by the ECJ on several occasions. However, performing a search on 
the Curia database shows that, in fact, the Court has referred to the Grimaldi judgment only seven 
                                                             
26 AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer has held that there are no serious impediments to extending the Grimaldi case law to 
other forms of soft law, such as guidelines. See Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-415/07, Lodato 
Gennaro & C. SpA v Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS) and SCCI, EU:C:2008:658. For the opposite 
view, see Senden 2004, 391. 
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times.27 All the judgments are preliminary rulings, delivered between 1993 and 2014.28 The nature 
and scope of the legal effects of soft law have also been dealt with or touched on in other judgments 
handed down by the ECJ, but, in order to offer a systematic analysis, this contribution is interested 
only in Grimaldi case law, namely the judgments of the ECJ that make explicit reference to 
Grimaldi.29  
 The first judgment, given in 1993 in the case Deutsche Shell AG, examined the legal effects 
of recommendations adopted by the Joint Committee within the framework of the Convention on 
a Common Transit Procedure.30 The Convention laid down measures for the movement of goods 
between the Community and the EFTA countries by introducing a common transit procedure for 
all goods, regardless of their kind or origin. Article 14 of the Convention established a Joint 
Committee entrusted with the administration and implementation of the Convention. Under Article 
15 of the Convention, the Joint Committee could make recommendations and, in the cases 
provided for in Article 15(3), adopt decisions, which are then to be put into effect by the 
Contracting Parties in accordance with their own legislation.  
 The Joint Committee adopted “arrangements” concerning the sealing of goods applicable 
in trade with Switzerland and Austria. As required by the Convention, the national German 
authority implemented these “arrangements” by a decision, which Deutsche Shell AG 
subsequently contested in the national court. The referring court presented the ECJ with several 
individual but related questions, among which was the question of whether the ECJ has jurisdiction 
                                                             
27 One explanation that may be put forward here is that, historically, precedent has not played much role in the 
Court’s reasoning. See Takis Tridimas, “Precedent and the Court of Justice: A Jurisprudence of Doubt?” in Julie 
Dickson and Pavlos Eleftheriadis (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (OUP, 2012), 307–330, 
308. 
28 The search covered the years up until 2015. AsG are generally considered to be more soft law friendly than judges, 
and the Grimaldi decision shows up in the search results for the opinions of AsG. For instance, in the Kalanke case, 
AG Tesauro cited Grimaldi and noted that soft law “may, as the court has held, certainly be used as an aid for 
interpreting other Community provisions which it is intended to complement”. See the Opinion of AG Tesauro in 
Case C-450/93, Eckhard Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen, EU:C:1995:105, point 20. Moreover, the General 
Court (GC) has made reference to Grimaldi in a total of four cases, see Case T-346/03, Krikorian and Others v 
Parliament and Others, EU:T:2003:348; Case T-240/04, France v Commission, EU:T:2007:290; Case T-109/06, 
Vodafone España and Vodafone Group v Commission, EU:T:2007:384, and Case T-721/14, Belgium v Commission, 
EU:T:2015:829. However, since the focus is on the relationship between the ECJ and national courts, opinions of 
AsG and the judgments of the GC are not part of the present analysis.  
29 It is, of course, possible to argue that instead of going to back to the “original” case, the Court cites more recent 
cases that have cited Grimaldi. In other words, the ECJ does not refer to Grimaldi but refers to, for instance, 
Deutsche Shell or Altair Chimica, which both cited Grimaldi. However, the ECJ has continued to refer to Grimaldi 
over a period of nearly 30 years, which seems to suggest that it has not systematically applied “the most recent case” 
formula, should it exist.  
30 Case C-188/91, Deutsche Shell AG v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg, EU:C:1993:24.  
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to interpret Committee recommendations, and also whether the Joint Committee has the power to 
recommend that certain practices be followed in Member States. Starting with the former, the 
Court embarked on an assessment of the legal nature of the “arrangements”. Referring to Grimaldi, 
given only a few years earlier, the ECJ maintained that neither lack of binding effect of the 
recommendation nor its adoption by the Joint Committee precludes the Court from ruling on its 
interpretation. 31  Analogously, although individuals cannot rely on recommendations before 
national courts to enforce their rights, the latter are “obliged to take them into consideration 
especially when, as in this case, they are of relevance in interpreting the provisions of the 
Convention”.32 The Court also confirmed that the Joint Committee has the authority to recommend 
certain arrangements be adopted at national level.33 
Almost ten years passed before the second ruling containing a reference to Grimaldi 
appeared. In Altair Chimica,34 the issue in the proceedings between Chimica and ENEL concerned 
the interpretation of several pieces of legislative and soft law norms. The Florence court of appeal 
asked whether Articles 81, 82 and 85 EC (now Articles 101, 102 and 105 TFEU), Directive 92/12 
or Council Recommendation 81/924 on electricity tariff structures must be interpreted as to 
preclude a measure providing for the levy of surcharges on the price of electricity. After finding 
that primary and secondary legislation did not preclude a Member State from imposing surcharges 
on electricity, the Court examined the recommendation more closely. Repeating the Grimaldi 
formula in full,35 the ECJ found that the recommendation is inapplicable to the current proceedings 
because it only regulates the structure of tariff, not the price. Thus, in the Court’s understanding, 
“Recommendation 81/924 does not prevent a Member State from levying surcharges such as those 
at issue in the main proceedings”.36  
In the third case, Friesland Coberco Dairy Foods BV, the Court adjudicated on the legal 
effects of conclusions of the Customs Code Committee and its own jurisdiction to rule on the 
                                                             
31 Ibid., para. 18. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., para. 23. 
34 Case C-207/01, Altair Chimica SpA v ENEL Distribuzione SpA, EU:C:2003:451. In later cases, Altair Chimica was 
often referred together with Grimaldi (e.g. in Arcor, Rosalba Alassini or ‘Baltlanta’ UAB). 
35 Case C-207/01, para. 41. 
36 Ibid., para. 43. Note that AG Jacobs argued, on the basis of Grimaldi, that the effects of soft law were “somewhat 
limited”, as soft law instruments had only to be taken into account by the Courts and could only cast light on hard 
law provisions. Therefore, the recommendation could not invalidate the conclusions previously reached on the basis 
of the Treaty provisions and the Directive. See Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-207/01, Altair Chimica SpA v 
ENEL Distribuzione SpA, EU:C:2003:151, point 57. 
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validity of those conclusions in the context of the preliminary reference procedure.37  The EU 
customs legislation is harmonised in the Customs Code established by Council Regulation (EEC) 
2913/92. To ensure the correct application of EU customs measures, implementing powers are 
conferred on the Commission, assisted by the Customs Code Committee. Referring to Grimaldi, 
the ECJ once again confirmed that its jurisdiction extends to all acts of the institutions without 
exceptions.38 However, as the Committee’s conclusions could not “be imputed to the Commission”, 
that is, they were not acts of the EU institution, the Court found them to fall outside its jurisdiction.39 
With regard to the legal effects of the Committee’s conclusions, the ECJ insisted that they 
are not binding on national customs authorities. To support its conclusion, the Court remarked that 
the Committee was established to ensure close and effective cooperation between Member States 
and the Commission, and, thus, the Committee’s role consists of “assisting the competent national 
authorities to take decision, not in imposing constraints on them”.40 In other words, while Member 
State customs officials must give the conclusion due regard, they cannot be relied upon to 
determine the limits of a final decision of the authority. A degree of binding force is, however, 
implied by reason of the fact that the authorities must give reasons should they depart from the 
Committee’s conclusion. 41  The case is exceptional because the Court de facto ruled on the 
substance of the case without actually having the formal authority to interpret the measures in 
question.  
A few years later, the Court delivered its fourth Grimaldi judgment in Arcor.42 By a series 
of questions, the national court asked the ECJ to interpret several provisions of Regulation 
2887/2000, in particular those regulating access of network operators to the local loop. In 
interpreting the Regulation, the Court used not one but three Commission Recommendations to 
aid its own interpretation.43  The decision in Arcor marks the first time, in the context of the 
                                                             
37 Case C-11/05, Friesland Coberco Dairy Foods BV v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Douane Noord/kantoor 
Groningen, EU:C:2006:312. 
38 Ibid., para. 36. 
39 Ibid., para. 37. The ruling contradicts the decision in Deutsche Shell in which the fact that recommendations were 
not adopted by the institutions did not preclude the Court from ruling on the case. For the Court they nonetheless 
constituted “a measure of Community law”. See Case C-188/91, para. 18.  
40 Case C-11/05, para. 30. In this respect, the Court also relied on the case law concerning the opinions of the 
Committee on Common Customs Tariff Nomenclature. Although these opinions constitute an important means of 
ensuring the uniform application by national customs authorities of the Customs Code and as such they may be 
considered as a valid aid to the interpretation of the Code, they do not have legally binding force, see ibid., para. 39.  
41 Case C-11/05, para. 27. 
42 Case C-55/06, Arcor AG & Co. KG v Germany, EU:C:2008:244. 
43 Ibid., e.g. paras 63, 82, 83 and 130. 
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Grimaldi jurisprudence, that the Court itself resorted to soft law. 
In one such instance, the Court argued that “it is necessary to rely on Recommendation 
2000/417 which, as opposed to the other recommendations … concerns specifically unbundled 
access to the local loop and also refers to Directives 97/33 and 98/10”.44 The Court emphasised 
two issues: first, the Commission Recommendation specifically regulated the disputed matter, and, 
second, it referred to the underlying legislative framework. The ECJ further remarked that the 
approach endorsed by the Recommendation “will foster fair and sustainable competition and 
provide alternative investment incentives”.45 However, it admitted that other alternative approaches 
cannot be ruled out, and the national regulatory authority (NRA) is in a position to make a decision 
that reflects each individual competitive situation.46  
VB Pénzügyi Lízing, the fifth relevant judgment, concerns the interpretation of Council 
Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts.47 The referring court inquired about 
the provisions which may be the subject of a preliminary ruling, in particular the jurisdiction of 
the ECJ to interpret the concept of “unfair term” appearing in the Directive and its annex. In its 
response to the national court, the ECJ invoked Grimaldi to establish its jurisdiction.48 The case 
does not contain soft law acts so the reference to Grimaldi was only to give weight to the universal 
jurisdiction of the ECJ.  
The next judgment, the joined cases of Rosalba Alassini, deals with the interpretation of 
the principle of effective judicial protection in relation to out-of-court settlements of consumer 
disputes in the area of electronic communications. Under Article 34 of the Universal Service 
Directive, Member States must ensure that transparent, simple and inexpensive out-of-court 
procedures are available, enabling disputes involving consumers and relating to issues covered by 
that Directive to be settled fairly and promptly.49 The applicable regulatory framework consisted, 
in addition to the Directive, of two Recommendations 98/257/EC and 2001/310/EC which set out 
                                                             
44 Ibid., para. 94 (emphasis added). 
45 Ibid. 
46 See similarly in the area of competition law where Commission guidelines have the purpose of guiding the courts 
and competition authorities of the Member States when they apply the provisions of EU law. However, they do not 
have binding effect on Member State authorities. See, e.g., Case C‑360/09, Pfleiderer, EU:C:2011:389, para. 21 or 
Case C-226/11, Expedia Inc. v Autorité de la concurrence and Others, EU:C:2012:795, para. 31 where the Court 
stated that the national authority “may take [guidelines] into account … but is not required to do so”.  
47 Case C-137/08, VB Pénzügyi Lízing Zrt. v Ferenc Schneider, EU:C:2010:659. 
48 Ibid., para. 38. 
49 See Directive 2002/22/EC on Universal Service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks 
and services (OJ 2002 L 108, p. 51). 
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the principles applicable to out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes. The Italian legislation 
required that parties must attempt to achieve an out-of-court settlement before they can refer their 
case to court. 50  The referring court wished to ascertain whether such national legislation is 
precluded on the basis of the Directive and with reference to the principle of effective judicial 
protection. The Court held that, when making available those out-of-court procedures at the 
national level, the Member States must take due account of Recommendation 98/257, as stated in 
the preamble of the Directive. In this respect, the Court, however, stressed that neither the Directive 
nor the Recommendation were precise enough to guide the Member States in establishing relevant 
procedures.51  
The seventh and most recent Grimaldi case is from 2014. The decision in ‘Baltlanta’ UAB 
concerned the company’s application for damages for material and non-material loss suffered by 
it as a result of being prevented from obtaining financial assistance from the Union structural funds. 
The referring Lithuanian court asked how Article 38(1)(e) of Regulation 1260/1999, Article 19 of 
Regulation 2792/1999, and Sections 6 and 7 of the Commission guidelines must be interpreted in 
this context.52 As regards the guidelines, the Court argued, after reiterating the Grimaldi doctrine, 
that the Commission guidelines must be interpreted in accordance with the binding EU law 
provisions they supplement, in this case Regulation 1260/1999.53  This is a highly interesting 
statement because the ECJ usually examines the exact opposite question: that is, soft law’s role in 
the interpretation of the law. The Court found that neither the guidelines nor the two Regulations 
could be relied on by the applicant, as they had no relevance for the questions under consideration.54  
B. National level 
 
The judicial narrative – of Italian consumer legislation or Mr Grimaldi’s ailments – does not end 
with the delivery of the judgment by the ECJ, this being only “the story so far”. It is up to the 
                                                             
50 Joined Cases C-317/08 to C-320/08, Rosalba Alassini and Others v Telecom Italia SpA and Others, 
EU:C:2010:146. 
51 C-371/08, para. 41. As part of litigation, the Court also referred to the principle of effective judicial protection of 
Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Norbert Reich, for instance, interprets this as “’upgrading’ 
‘non-binding’ recommendations beyond Article 288(5) TFEU”. See Norbert Reich, “’Reflexive Contract 
Governance in the EU’ – David Trubek’s Contribution to a More Focused Approach to EU Contract Legislation” in 
Grainne de Búrca, Claire Kilpatrick and Joanne Scott (eds.), Critical Legal Perspectives on Global Governance: 
Liber Amicorum David M Trubek (Bloomsbury, 2013), 281.   
52 Case C-410/13, ‘Baltlanta’ UAB v Lietuvos valstybė, EU:C:2014:2134. 
53 Ibid., para. 65. 
54 Ibid., paras 66 and 67. 
 15 
referring national court to resolve the matter conclusively. In order to find out how the advice 
offered by the ECJ, in particular the guidance concerning soft law, was applied by the courts in 
subsequent national proceedings, the follow-up practice of the referring court after the ECJ’s 
judgment was examined. The search for the national final rulings was, however, met with varying 
degrees of success, and tracing the proceedings in the national jurisdictions proved complicated.55  
 The Association of the Council of States and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions (ACA-
Europe) operates two databases (DEC.NAT and JuriFast) that include information on preliminary 
rulings, the reply of the ECJ, and the final decision by the national court.56 Containing nearly 30,000 
references to national decisions from 1959 up to the present day, the data in the DEC.NAT can be 
searched online. Of the eight cases examined above (Grimaldi as well as the seven cases 
mentioning Grimaldi), the DEC.NAT only contains a final judgment in Grimaldi.57 In its judgment 
given on 6 September 1990, the Belgian Labour Court relied on the European list of occupational 
diseases adopted as a recommendation to qualify the ailment affecting Mr Grimaldi’s shoulders 
and hands as an occupational disease. Since the disability percentage rates in respect of shoulders 
had previously been established, it ordered the Fonds des maladies professionnelles to compensate 
Mr Grimaldi and ordered further expert investigation to establish the disability percentage rates in 
respect of hands. In other words, the national court followed the advice given by the ECJ and 
compensated Mr Grimaldi on the basis of the Commission recommendation. It ended well for Mr 
Grimaldi. 
Furthermore, the DEC.NAT contains a link to the national final ruling in Friesland. The 
information provided by the website is in Dutch with no English summary.58 The attempts to obtain 
                                                             
55 This is not, as such, surprising because it is generally recognised that the delivery of the judgment by the ECJ is 
precisely the temporal point where the judicial narrative ends, and no one seems to know whether national courts 
subsequently follow the ECJ. See Michal Bobek, “Of Feasibility and Silent Elephants: The Legitimacy of the Court 
of Justice through the Eyes of National Courts” in Maurice Adams et al (eds.), Judging Europe’s Judges: The 
Legitimacy of the Case Law of the European Court of Justice Examined (Hart Publishing, 2013). In one study, it was 
found that ECJ rulings are implemented in 96.3 per cent of the cases studied. See Stacy A Nyikos, “The Preliminary 
Reference Process. National Court Implementation, Changing Opportunity Structures and Litigant Desistment”, 4 
European Union Politics (2003), 379–419.    
56 www.aca-europe.eu/index.php/en/dec-nat-en (last visited 9 June 2018). The information in the DEC.NAT database 
is collected by the ECJ and transmitted to ACA-Europe. ACA-Europe has also developed another database, JuriFast. 
The information is entered into it directly by the members of ACA-Europe. Coordinating this work, ACA-Europe 
offers translations of descriptions and summaries. It contains just over 2 000 decisions. 
57 The database contains basic information on Altair Chimica, Rosalba Alassini and NB Pénzüguyi Lìzing but the 
national judgment is missing. 
58 Link to the 
judgment: http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH0606&keyword=C-
11%2f05&keyword=c-11%2f05 (last visited 9 June 2018).  
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copies of the other six final judgments through directly addressing the respective national 
judiciaries were not successful.59 In one case, the request for a copy of a national ruling was denied 
for procedural reasons. The Hungarian court refused to disclose the national final ruling in VB 
Pénzügyi Lízing on the grounds that Paragraph 119. § (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure does not 
permit third parties to receive a copy of the final judgment.60 The remaining national judiciaries did 
not respond, and the repeated emails went unanswered. 
With regard to clarifying the scope of domestic application of Grimaldi, the attempts to 
retrieve the final judgments by the national court unfortunately amounted to very little. A good 
guess is that the national court accepts the guidance offered to it by the ECJ and acts accordingly. 
In the situations in which the ECJ comes to the conclusion that soft law is not applicable, since the 
question(s) referred fall outside the material scope of application of, usually, the recommendation 
(Altair Chimica, ‘UAB’ Baltlanta), or because soft law rules are too imprecise to be useful 
(Rosalba Alassini), it is unlikely that the national court would concern itself with non-binding 
guidance when it gives the decision. By contrast, the ECJ’s conclusion to use the recommendation 
to guide its own interpretation (Arcor) will inevitably have a similar effect at the national level.   
 
IV Is there a common pattern emerging? 
 
Those seven judgments referencing Grimaldi can be categorised into two main groups: those 
dealing with jurisdiction and those with applicability, i.e., whether soft law acts can be relied on 
by the court in situations of interpretative ambiguity. The first group comprises Deutsche Shell, 
Friesland Coberco Dairy Foods, and NB Pénzüguyi. In these three cases, the ECJ used Grimaldi 
to universally confirm the principle that it has jurisdiction with regard to soft law. However, the 
concrete application of the principle was different in the cases. In Deutsche Shell and NB 
Pénzüguyi, the Court established that it has jurisdiction. In Friesland Coberco Dairy Foods, the 
Court instead held that the conclusions of the Customs Code Committee were not the acts of the 
institutions, and, hence, they could not be examined in the preliminary reference procedure. The 
difference between Deutsche Shell and Friesland Coberco Dairy Foods is susceptible to criticism 
on the ground that the Recommendations of the Joint Committee in Deutsche Shell cannot be 
                                                             
59 The requests for copies of the national final judgments were sent in spring 2016 by Daniel Wyatt.  
60 Personal communication, dated 3 March 2016 (on file with author). 
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regarded as an institutional act, a consideration which the ECJ appeared to ignore at the time. 
Generally speaking, however, the Court has consistently ruled that it has jurisdiction to review 
instruments and measures irrespective of whether or not they have binding force.61  
The second group consists of the four cases where the issue was the significance of soft 
law instruments in the interpretation of the law. The formal legal nature of the measure did not 
figure prominently in the Court’s analysis in any of these cases. In two of the cases (Altair Chimica 
and ‘Baltlanta’ UAB), the ECJ rejected the use of non-binding guidance, not because of the lack 
of binding force, but, rather, because the instrument was of no assistance to the interpretation of 
the law. The issue of binding effect was not taken up in Rosalba Alassini and Arcor either. While 
in the former the ECJ ruled, in accordance with the preamble to the relevant Directive, that national 
authorities must take due account of the Commission recommendation, in the latter the Court used 
the Commission recommendation to guide its own interpretation.  
 
Table 1. Scope and effects of the Grimaldi jurisprudence. 
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(1) Ex Article 211(2) EC. Post-Lisbon provision is Article 17 TEU. 
(2) Article 15 of the Convention on a Common Transit Procedure. OJ 1987 L 226. 
(3) Ex Article 235 EC. 
(4) Article 504 of the Commission Regulation (EEC) 2454/93. 
(5) Ex Article 211 EC (17 TEU). See also Recital 13 of the Regulation 2887/2000 that endorsed the prior 
guidance given in the form of Commission recommendation. 
(6) Ex Article 211 EC (17 TEU). See also Recital 47 of the Universal Service Directive 2002/22/EC: 
“Member States should take full account of Commission Recommendation 98/257/EC…”. 
(7) Article 88 EC (108 TFEU). 
(8) Article 19 of Directive 2002/21/EC. 
 
Apart from the subject matter, is it possible to deduce a common pattern from the Grimaldi case 
law? As Table 1 shows, the Grimaldi jurisprudence is spread across different policy domains. 
Combining this with the small number of the cases renders it difficult to establish a clear 
correlation between the policy area and the other variables. What about the form of the soft law 
instrument in question? The original soft law instrument was the Commission recommendation 
but, as demonstrated by the column “Policy instrument” in Table 1, the ECJ has extended the 
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Grimaldi guidance to “Joint Committee Recommendation”, to “Council Recommendation”, and 
perhaps most interestingly, “Commission guidelines” in ‘Baltlanta’ UAB. In this respect, the case 
law seems to offer some support to the argument, put forward by AsG and academics, that 
Grimaldi can be applied to instruments other than those enshrined in Article 288 TFEU. With the 
exception of Deutsche Shell, the Court’s Grimaldi jurisprudence only covers soft law documents 
issued by the institutions.  
The ECJ has systematically paraphrased the Grimaldi obligation as it relates to national 
courts (see the middle column in Table 1). Apart from Deutsche Shell, where the Court used the 
word “obliged”, it has, in all other cases, reiterated the expression “bound to take into account” 
from Grimaldi.62 The jurisprudence does not provide any further clarification as to the actual scope 
of the guidance. In some judgments the Court also provided guidance to the national regulatory 
authority, as shown in the column “Scope of duty”. A representative example is Arcor in which 
the ECJ diligently, provision by provision, set out the content of the Recommendation before 
concluding that a different interpretation, not the one put forward by the Recommendation, is 
possible, and that “the NRA is in a position to take account of each individual competitive 
situation”.63  
Can the ECJ then only bind national judiciaries to Grimaldi where the adoption of soft law 
meets some kind of legal mandate? In all of the analysed judgments, the Court expressly referred 
to either the competence of the institutions to adopt non-binding rules, or that a particular piece of 
secondary legislation obliges Member States to fully account for such norms. I return to this 
interesting issue immediately below, as it relates to further developments in the Grimaldi 
jurisprudence.  
 
V Life after Chemische Fabrik Kreussler and Koninklijke: What’s left of Grimaldi? 
 
Table 1, detailing the Grimaldi jurisprudence, is complemented with additional information on 
two cases. The decision in Chemische Fabrik Kreussler (CFK) was given after Rosalba Alassini 
but before ‘Baltlanta’ UAB whereas the Koninklijke decision was delivered after ‘Baltlanta’ UAB 
in 2016. Both are placed in the Table 1 after the ‘Baltlanta’ UAB. The rationale for discussing 
                                                             
62 In all cases the French expression was identical: “sont … tenus … prendre en consideration”. 
63 Case C-55/06, para. 95. 
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these cases in connection with the Grimaldi jurisprudence is simple: the ECJ answered the 
Grimaldi question, yet neither referenced nor even mentioned Grimaldi.64  
 The CFK judgment dealt with the interpretation of the Medical Directive, raised in the 
proceedings concerning the classification of a mouthwash solution called ‘PAROEX 0,12%’, 
between two German mouthwash producers, Sunstar Deutschland GmbH and Chemische Fabrik 
Kreussler. One of the questions asked by the referring court was whether it could rely on the 
Commission guidelines when defining the term “pharmacological action”. Without reference to 
Grimaldi, the ECJ noted that whilst guidelines are not legally binding or enforceable against 
individuals, they may nevertheless “provide useful information for the interpretation of the 
relevant provisions of European Union law and therefore contribute to ensuring that they are 
applied uniformly”.65 For this reason, the national court “may … take account of that document”.66 
What is striking is the manner in which the ECJ argued the case: it analysed the legal effects of 
soft law as if the question was novel. The CFK decision is short and not overly articulate, with the 
Court failing to explain why it chose to deploy the formulation “may take”.67 Two initial options 
present themselves: either we treat CFK as a judicial anomaly, the significance of which is strictly 
restricted to the circumstances of the case, or we openly consider the possibility that the ECJ 
deliberately chose not to apply Grimaldi.  
 CFK was almost immediately referred to in subsequent jurisprudence, suggesting that it 
was not an anomaly.68  Let us then assume, for the sake of the argument, that the ECJ departed from 
the precedent set by Grimaldi.69 This immediately begs the question of why the Court would do 
such a thing. There are, in effect, several options. First, we could argue that, rather than reversing 
                                                             
64 Koninklijke included reference to the Arcor decision. Note that CFK and Koninklijke are not the only cases in 
which the ECJ has used the Grimaldi formula but has not explicitly referred to it. However, I am concerned only 
with these two cases, as in them the national court asked the Grimaldi question, that is, whether it is bound to take 
soft law into account.  
65 Case C-308/11, para. 25. 
66 Ibid., para. 26. In French: “peut … tenir compte du dit document”.  
67 Note though that the Court has used the same formulation in Case C‑360/09, para. 21 or Case C-226/11, para. 31 
holding that the national authority “may take [guidelines] into account … but is not required to do so”. 
68 The decision in CFK was cited in Case C-106/14, Fédération des entreprises du commerce et de la distribution 
(FCD) and Fédération des magasins de bricolage et de l’aménagement de la maison (FMB) v Ministre de 
l’Écologie, du Développement durable et de lʼÉnergie, EU:C:2015:576, para. 28: “It is true that Article 77(2) of the 
REACH Regulation confers on the Secretariat of the ECHA the task, inter alia, of ‘providing technical and scientific 
guidance and tools … and ‘preparing explanatory information on [that regulation] for other stakeholders’. Given the 
legislature’s intention, a document such as the ECHA Guidance document may be one of the factors to be taken into 
consideration in interpreting the REACH Regulation” (emphasis added). 
69 For the precedential value of the ECJ judgements, see Tridimas 2012. 
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Grimaldi in the strict sense of the word, the Court used the opportunity afforded by CFK in order 
to provide clarification. According to this line of reasoning, the Court may have grown concerned 
about the influence of soft law on the roles played by the ECJ and Member State courts.70 In this 
scenario, the ECJ perceived that, whilst the use of guidance by national courts (as instructed by 
Grimaldi) eases the workload for the overburdened ECJ, it also, at least theoretically, threatens the 
role of the ECJ as final arbiter and interpreter of EU law due to fewer Member State court referrals.  
This alternative reading is not only textually plausible, but also strongly supported by the 
Court’s observation in CFK. Namely, after concluding that the national court may take guidance 
into account, the ECJ continued by establishing that the national court needs to ensure that the:   
 
[I]nterpretation thus derived was derived in a manner consistent with the criteria laid down 
by the case-law relating to the interpretation of European Union legal acts, including those 
concerning the division of jurisdiction between the national courts and the Court in the 
context of preliminary ruling proceedings.71  
 
What criteria does the ECJ have in mind? With regard to the preliminary ruling proceedings, the 
generally held view is that application is for national courts and interpretation for EU courts.72 Does 
this apply to EU soft law guidance as well, and could the CFK decision be simply read to signal 
that the Court has the sole authority to interpret guidelines? EU soft law has grown in complexity 
as well as in number over the years, and it requires now, unlike at the time of Grimaldi, an act of 
interpretation from those using them, something in which the ECJ may not want the national courts 
to engage. If the ECJ has the exclusive authority to interpret guidance, this would inevitably mean 
that the ECJ itself uses guidance to settle the issue of interpretation for national courts, as it did in 
CFK. Be that as it may, it is hard to see how the new formulation “may take” would help the Court 
to uphold its interpretative authority beyond creating a suboptimal outcome, namely triggering 
more references from national courts perplexed by the new formulation in CFK.  
Second, the argument can be put forward that the ECJ chose to employ a different 
formulation of expression because the case involved a different non-binding measure. Whereas the 
                                                             
70 See also Emilia Korkea-aho, “Legal Interpretation of Framework Directives: A Soft Law Approach”, 40 European 
Law Review (2015), 70–88. 
71 Case C-308/11, para. 26. 
72 However, it is a generally held view that the Court frequently rules on matters of fact. 
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Grimaldi instrument was a Commission Recommendation, CFK concerned a Commission 
guidance document. Once again, this is less plausible after ‘Baltlanta’ UAB, where the ECJ applied 
the Grimaldi formula to cover Commission guidelines. 
Third, the different formulation in CFK may be attributed to the fact that the adoption of 
the Commission guidance document was not foreseen in the Treaties or secondary legislation.73 As 
column “Primary act/legal instrument” in Table 1 illustrates, in all cases where the ECJ has 
endorsed the Grimaldi doctrine, the adoption of a soft law act can be traced back either to the 
Treaty provisions or relevant secondary law.74 Further elaboration of this point requires that we 
return to Grimaldi to illustrate the little-appreciated fact that the ECJ had, already then, explicitly 
acknowledged the competence issue in relation to soft law acts. It held that recommendations are 
adopted where the institutions do not have the powers under the Treaties to adopt binding measures 
or where it is not “appropriate to adopt more mandatory rules”.75 The principle of conferral of 
powers and the choice of the correct legal basis do not apply to soft law acts. This does not mean, 
contrary to what sometimes seems to be assumed, that soft law falls outside of all manner of 
competence control, or that the institutions are capable of adopting soft law acts at will. On the 
contrary, the institutions do not have an “unlimited competence” to adopt soft law.76 Indeed, in 
Grimaldi “the Court’s statement implies that it recognises the competence of the Commission, and 
of other institutions, to adopt recommendations, without however indicating the foundation of this 
competence”.77 
This is where the systematic analysis of the Grimaldi case law again comes into play: 
namely, the jurisprudence strongly points to the existence of the “lite” competence test. By this I 
mean that, although the competence control does not apply to soft law in the sense that a legal 
basis must be found in the Treaties, the “lite” test requires that soft law is based on a mandate or 
the support of either the Treaties or secondary law. In awareness of the limited number of cases on 
                                                             
73 However, the Guidance Document in question was adopted in 2004 when ex Article 211(2) EC was still 
applicable. 
74 Among others: With regard to Grimaldi, the Commission had wide discretion to issue opinions and 
recommendations under ex Article 155 EEC (ex Article 211(2) EC). In Deutsche Shell, the Joint Committee was 
mandated by the express provision in the Convention on the Common Transit Procedure to give recommendations. 
In ‘Baltlanta’ UAB, the Commission had powers under Article 88 EC to propose any appropriate measures required 
by the progressive development or by the functioning of the common market. 
75 Case C-322/88, para. 13. 
76 See Linda Senden and A. Van den Brink, Checks and Balances of Soft EU Rule-Making. Study for the European 
Parliament, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, PE 462 (2012), 21. 
77 Senden 2004, 297. 
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the basis of which I operate here, the longitudinal analysis of the Grimaldi case law (the right 
column in Table 1) appears to suggest a pattern. That is that the ECJ has endorsed the legal effects 
of soft law for national courts where either primary or secondary law confers on the institutions, 
usually the Commission as the prime source of EU soft law, the task of providing further guidance, 
or where soft law guidance is in other ways foreseen in the underlying legislation. 
The case where the ECJ ‘maxed out’ Grimaldi is an exceptional yet instructive example of 
this pattern. In Koninklijke, the situation between the parties was highly sensitive. The Dutch court 
had twice annulled the decision of the national regulatory authority on the grounds that the 
authority had applied the Commission Recommendation, which contravened the national rules. 
The ECJ, clearly recognising the danger in asserting that EU soft law rules have primacy over 
national rules, began by underlining how the national court, as a reviewing court, must have “the 
appropriate expertise to enable it to carry out its functions effectively”.78  Citing the Grimaldi 
doctrine (yet referencing only the decision in Arcor), the Court held that while Commission 
recommendations do not bind the national courts, they are bound to take them into consideration 
for the purpose of deciding disputes submitted to them. As such this adds nothing new to the 
Grimaldi jurisprudence. The ECJ could not, however, leave it here because taking the 
recommendation into consideration would effectively result in the disregarding of national binding 
law. Hence, the ECJ continued by saying that “a national court may depart from Recommendation 
2009/396 only where … it considers that this is required on grounds related to the facts of the 
individual case, in particular the specific characteristics of the market of the Member State in 
question”.79  
How can the difference between CFK (may take account) and Koninklijke (may depart only 
where…) be explained? The decision in Koninklijke regarding the legal effects of the 
recommendation is anchored firmly in the factual circumstances of the liberalisation of the 
telecommunications market, to the extent that the ECJ appears to argue that national courts cannot 
bring back distortions of competition that the Commission Recommendation was adopted to 
remove. National courts can set the recommendation aside and refuse to apply EU soft law only if 
they are capable of justifying the departure. Justification must be provided not only in terms of 
                                                             
78 Case C-28/15, para. 39.  
79 Ibid., para. 40. See also Opinion of AG Mengozzi in Case C-28/15, Koninklijke KPN and Others v Autoritiet 
Consument en Markt (ACM), EU:C:2016:310, point 78.  
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legal arguments but, perhaps even more importantly, in terms of factual conditions that support 
the conclusion that national law should prevail over commonly agreed EU soft law rules.80 Leaving 
issue-area related aspects aside, CFK and Koninklijke are, nevertheless, in line with the analysis 
undertaken above, which suggests that the ECJ has endorsed the power of soft law to guide 
Member State courts where the institutions have power, under the Treaties or relevant secondary 
law, to adopt non-binding measures. In CFK, the adoption of soft law could not be traced to a 
primary act or a secondary legal instrument, whereas in Koninklijke, the reference is to the 
Framework Directive. Pursuant to the Directive, the Commission is entitled to issue 
recommendations, and Member States are obliged to ensure that their national regulatory 
authorities take these into account when carrying out their tasks.81  
 
Challenging the validity of soft law in Article 267 TFEU proceedings? 
 
Before concluding, one further point should perhaps be made about the consequences of 
emphasising a “lite” competence control. Namely, the more the ECJ emphasises the fact that the 
task to make further rules has been conferred on the institutions by the underlying legislation, the 
more explicitly it also invites national courts to engage in competence control, to challenge the 
validity of EU soft law by questioning the competence of the Commission, and of other institutions, 
to adopt non-binding measures. Whilst Grimaldi in principle affirmed that the ECJ can give a 
preliminary ruling on the interpretation, as well as the validity, of non-binding instruments,82 
subsequent case law seems to imply that the national courts cannot challenge the validity of a non-
binding instrument utilising the Article 267 TFEU procedure. In Deutsche Shell, the national court 
inquired about the validity of the recommendation, but the Court ignored this question and only 
ruled on the interpretation of the recommendation.83 Echoing the judicial evasion in response to 
validity challenges, the view taken in the literature is that the validity of non-binding instruments 
cannot be challenged in the preliminary ruling mechanism due to uncertainties as to whether the 
                                                             
80 This was, in effect, also suggested by AG Kokott in Case C-266/11, Expedia, EU:C:2012:544, point 39. 
81 Article 19 of Directive 2002/21/EC: “Where a national regulatory authority chooses not to follow a 
recommendation, it shall inform the Commission giving the reasoning for its position”. Arguably such duty could be 
derived from the negative obligation contained in Article 4(3) TEU requiring Member States not to jeopardize the 
attainment of the objectives of EU law.  
82 Case C-322/88, para. 8. 
83 Case C-188/91. 
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instrument constitutes an “act”. In reference to Grimaldi, Scott notes that the ECJ has accepted “a 
reference concerning the interpretation of a recommendation with a view to ascertaining its 
capacity to produce legal effects. But in relation to questions of validity, the requirement that the 
measure be intended to produce legal effects would seem to apply”.84  
In a recent judgment, the ECJ seems to have reversed its course, allowing a Member State 
court the ability to refer a question concerning the validity of a non-binding instrument. In Kotnik 
and Others, the Slovenian court raised the question of the validity of the Commission Banking 
Communication, and in this respect, also whether the Commission had acted ultra vires in issuing 
the Communication.85 The Slovenian Government and the Commission, following the established 
line of thinking, expressed doubts about whether the validity of the Banking Communication is an 
admissible question, since that communication produces no legal effects directly on third 
parties.86 The Court first explained that the case “concerns the compatibility, with a number of 
provisions of EU law, of the condition laid down by the Commission [in the Banking 
Communication] that there must be burden-sharing by shareholders and subordinated creditors”, 
before it emphatically concluded that “the validity of such a condition must be capable of being 
reviewed by the Court in the procedure provided for by Article 267 TFEU”.87  It did not tie 
admissibility to the capability of the Banking Communication to produce legal effects, failing to 
even raise the question of the legal effects of the Communication. The Court therefore seems to 
expressly open the door to the national courts raising questions of validity of soft law as part of 
                                                             
84 Joanne Scott, “In Legal Limbo: Post-Legislative Guidance as a Challenge for European Administrative Law”, 48 
Common Market Law Review (2011), 329–355, 346 fn 84. 
85 The ultra vires argument concerned in particular points 40 to 46 of the Banking Communication. 
86 C-526/14, para. 31. See also Opinion of AG Wahl in Case C-526/14, point 23 et seq: “At the outset, the 
Commission points out that the Banking Communication is not an act addressed to individuals and is not intended to 
create rights for individuals. On that basis, the Commission expresses doubts as to the Court’s jurisdiction to answer 
the questions referred. The Commission’s argument is, in my view, ill founded. The mere fact that an act is not 
addressed to individuals or intended to create rights for individuals does not mean that such an act falls outside the 
scope of the Article 267 TFEU procedure. The Commission’s argument would introduce distinctions between 
different acts of which there is no trace in that Treaty provision. What is key under Article 267 TFEU is, in fact, 
whether an answer from the Court on the interpretation or validity of the act in question is necessary to enable the 
national court to give judgment. In addition, as I will explain in the following, acts of ‘soft law’ (such as the 
Banking Communication), even if not binding for individuals, may nevertheless produce other kinds of legal effects. 
The Court has, accordingly, on numerous occasions answered questions referred by national courts on provisions 
contained in acts of ‘soft law’.”  
87 Ibid., para. 33. The ECJ concluded that the validity of the Banking Communication in the light of the provisions of 
Directive 2012/30 cannot be called into question by Member State actions that do not comply with the Banking 
Communication, see ibid., para. 85.  
 26 
Article 267 TFEU proceedings.88 The requirement that the measure produces or is intended to 
produce legal effects would not seem to apply.  
The above analysis does not definitively settle the question of whether national courts can 
refer questions concerning the validity of non-binding measures adopted by actors other than the 
institutions, e.g., the joint action of the Commission and the Member States.89 Neither it is clear 
whether national courts are obliged to take into account jointly prepared documents or those 
produced by EU agencies. The Court’s approach to the authorship issue is a complicated one that 
can only be briefly discussed here.90 The ECJ referenced the CFK decision in another judgment 
dealing with guidance prepared by the European Chemicals Agency, concluding that guidance 
“may be one of the factors to be taken into account” by the national court in deciding the case.91 
This would suggest that as far as EU agency guidance is concerned, national judiciaries can, but 
are not obliged to, consider non-binding rules. In relation to validity challenges, it is likely that the 
ECJ would only accept a reference concerning the validity of a soft law instrument insofar as it is 
an act of the institution. The Court has, however, recently asserted that harmonised EU standards 
can be considered under Article 267 TFEU because, although adopted by a private body and only 
“endorsed” by the Commission, they are adopted with a view to implementing EU law.92 The extent 
to which this has a ripple effect on soft law jurisprudence more generally cannot yet be appraised. 
 
VI Conclusions: A ‘soft’ doctrine for soft law? 
 
This Article set out to discuss the Grimaldi obligation, that is, the obligation of national courts to 
take soft law into account when they adjudicate on EU law. The 1989 decision that initially 
                                                             
88 Private applicants have occasionally challenged the competence of the institutions to adopt soft law. For example, 
Case T-694/14 where the applicant claimed that the Commission lacked the competence to adopt guidelines relating 
to the compatibility assessment of operating aid with the internal market. In GC’s view, the Commission has 
jurisdiction to adopt guidelines concerning the exercise of its powers of assessment and given that they do not 
contradict Treaty rules, they bind the institution that has adopted them, see Case T-694/14, European Renewable 
Energies Federation (EREF) v Commission, EU:T:2015:915. 
89 Note though that joint authorship is not a problem as long as the formal authorship remains with the institution. It 
is clear from CFK (given its explicit acknowledgement by the ECJ) that the Commission guidelines were “drawn up 
by group of experts from the national authorities, the Commission’s services and professional associations from 
industry”. See Case C-308/11, para. 25. 
90 See Eliantonio’s article in this Special Issue.  
91 Case C-106/14, para. 28, also fn 68 above. 
92 See Case C‑613/14, James Elliott Construction Limited v Irish Asphalt Limited, EU:C:2016:821, para. 43. 
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imposed the duty on national courts was given at a time when the EU regulatory framework was 
drastically different from what it is now, and the use of soft law as a mechanism of EU governance 
was very much in its infancy. Has the ECJ developed or fine-tuned the Grimaldi guidance to better 
make sense of the wildly differing conditions where EU soft law is these days adopted and applied? 
Is the doctrine still strong? How have the national courts operationalised the guidance?  
Contrary to what one may have assumed, only seven ECJ rulings referencing Grimaldi 
exist. Caution must be exercised, then, when searching for a common pattern. Furthermore, the 
ECJ has recently delivered two important judgments on the national effects of soft law without 
referencing the Grimaldi judgment. Whereas the Court in CFK advised that national courts “may 
take” soft law into account, in Koninklijke the ECJ ‘maxed out’ Grimaldi, to the extent that it is 
now exceedingly difficult for national courts to ignore soft law. Policy area alone fails to explain 
these variations in the judgments. Is it therefore time to bid farewell to Grimaldi?  
The evidence emerging from the longitudinal study of the Grimaldi jurisprudence suggests 
that the Court has applied the Grimaldi obligation, that is, imposed the duty to take soft law into 
account, only when soft law acts have been adopted in the framework of Treaty or secondary law. 
This – what I have called “lite” competence control – reflects and captures, quite naturally, the 
world of soft lawmaking as it was at the late 1980s and the 1990s. Then it was mainly the 
Commission, and sometimes the Council, that issued non-binding instruments that were based on 
Treaty or secondary norms, conferring on the institutions a general power to adopt soft law. This 
was unique to the EU then – a consequence of its smaller size and less ambitious scope – and this 
same simplicity no longer applies to the EU as we now know it. Although no definitive numbers 
can be provided, as the EU does not compile statistics on soft law acts, it seems undisputed that 
soft lawmaking has both intensified and diversified. In other words, although the doctrine has not 
changed, the world around it has, de facto marginalising the Grimaldi doctrine by eroding the 
foundations on which its logic rests.  
Consequently, although it is too early to bid farewell to Grimaldi, the obligation has 
become a “soft” doctrine, heavily nuanced on at least three counts. First, where soft law guidance 
is foreseen or embedded in the underlying legislation, the Grimaldi obligation applies in full. 
Further, jurisprudence post-Koninklijke suggests that in these cases, Member State courts can 
depart from the interpretation offered in such documents only where they can provide specific, 
detailed and substantively-grounded reasons as to why the soft law act does not apply. Whether 
 28 
this represents a continuing trend or is merely a consequence of the particular policy area 
circumstances will not be known for some years. Second, if the soft law instrument is free-standing, 
that is, is not derived from primary or secondary law, domestic judicial actors have more leeway 
to decide whether or not to take it into account. The same should in principle apply when the 
measure in question is prepared by e.g., EU agencies.  
The third noteworthy feature that emerges from the analysed jurisprudence is that Member 
States have become more proactive in challenging EU soft law and, insofar as it is an act of the 
institution, the Court is cautiously accepting the validity challenges posed by national courts. 
Allowing national courts’ validity challenges signals that the ECJ is aware of the daunting 
complexity and extent of soft law regulation across different policy areas and invites national 
courts to engage in a candid and constructive dialogue on the nature and scope of effects of soft 
law. This further underlines the importance of research into domestic actors. Despite the efforts to 
obtain copies of final national judgments, the attempts were not successful, and it was therefore 
not possible to establish how the national courts have understood and interpreted Grimaldi. 
Similarly little is known about judicial attitudes towards soft law in Member States.93  This is 
particularly unfortunate given the stronger and more proactive role that national courts are now 
assuming as regards EU soft law, with their raising, for instance, the question of institutional 
competence to adopt soft law acts.94 Plausible research into EU (soft) law can no longer rely on the 
assumption that the national judiciaries recognise, use or even accept EU soft law, and research 
into national courts, including the systematic follow-up of the national final judgments, can no 
longer be deferred.95  
 
 
                                                             
93 For instance, do both old and new Member States understand soft law in a similar manner? What about their 
capacity to monitor and evaluate the conditions of the use of soft law? On the new literature on national courts, see 
Bruno de Witte et al (eds.), National courts and EU law: new issues, theories and methods (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2016). 
94 This may capture and reflect broader development whereby “national courts appear to have become more assertive 
and the debate is less about fundamental rights and more about democracy and national constitutional identity”. See 
Takis Tridimas, “The ECJ and the National Courts. Dialogue, Cooperation and Instability” in Anthony Arnull and 
Damian Chalmers (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (OUP, 2015), 405.  
95 Many of the authors of this Special Issue (including the present author) are members of the “European Network on 
Soft Law Research (SoLaR)” bringing together academics from several EU Member States and from policy areas to 
pool knowledge on the national role and effects of soft law. SoLaR is a Jean Monnet Network co-funded by the 
Erasmus+ programme of the EU. More information can be found at: www.solar-network.eu.  
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